А.А. Корнилов, Ф. Руми, А.С. Матвеев

ПРОЦЕСС ФОРМИРОВАНИЯ ВНЕШНЕЙ ПОЛИТИКИ ИСЛАМСКОЙ РЕСПУБЛИКИ ИРАН

Практикум

Нижний Новгород
2015

Рецензент: к.ист.н. Н.А.Беренкова

В практикуме на английском языке публикуются базовые документы внешней политики Исламской Республики Иран, тексты Конституции ИРИ и Верховного Лидера Ирана аятоллы Сейеда Али Хаменеи. Вниманию студентов предлагаются материалы внешнеполитического курса президентов Ирана М. Ахмадинежада и Хасана Рухани, а также тексты государственных планов развития страны, учитывающих интересы ИРИ на международной арене.

Практикум предназначен для студентов Института международных отношений и мировой истории ННГУ, обучающихся по направлению «Зарубежное регионоведение» и изучающих дисциплину «Процесс формирования внешней политики ведущих государств» (магистерская программа «Исследования регионов Азии и Африки») и «Процесс формирования внешней политики и дипломатия» (бакалаврская программа «Ближний Восток»). Рекомендовано методической комиссией факультета международных отношений для студентов ННГУ, обучающихся по направлениям подготовки 41.03.01 «Зарубежное регионоведение»

© Нижегородский государственный университет им. Н.И. Лобачевского, 2015
Content

Introduction........................................................................................................................................4

Document 1. Iran’s Constitution and foreign policy...........................................................................5

Document 2. The Supreme Leader of Iran and foreign policy (Ideas and ideals of Ayatullah Ali Khamenei)........................................................................................................................................8

Document 3. Foreign policy of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad (the sixth President of Iran from 2005 to 2013)........................................................................................................................................23

Document 4. Hassan Rouhani and Iran’s Foreign Policy (the seventh President of Iran from 2013 to Present)........................................................................................................................................36

Document 5. Why Iran seeks constructive engagement.................................................................40

Document 6. What Iran Really Wants................................................................................................43


Document 9. IRAN 1404 Outlook (2025).............................................................................................63

Conclusion........................................................................................................................................66
Introduction

Decision-making process constitutes one of the most important parts of foreign policy. Contemporary foreign policy can be perceived as a set of objectives, orientations, values and decisions that a state pursues to achieve national goals in international scene. Foreign policy of any country affects the behavior of other countries and entire international system and is affected by the external environment as well. How governments make decisions and what factors impact on their decision and concepts remains to be a complex issue. To understand that we should take history, geography, culture, and other dimensions into account.

Foreign relations of the Islamic Republic of Iran develop in dynamic intergovernmental relationships between Iran and other countries. Geography should be recognized as a very significant factor in forming Iran's foreign policy. Following the 1979 Iranian Revolution, the newly born Islamic Republic, under the leadership of Ayatollah Khomeini, dramatically reversed the pro-American foreign policy of the last Shah of Iran, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi. Since then the country's policies have oscillated between the two opposing tendencies of revolutionary ardors, which would eliminate Western and non-Muslim influences while promoting the Islamic revolution abroad, and pragmatists which would advance economic development and normalization of relations with outside world. That is why the Iran's bilateral relations often look uneven and contradictory.

Lobachevsky University of Nizhni Novgorod students are extremely interested to know strategies and concepts of Iran foreign policy from primary sources. In order to meet this interest we publish collection of basic documents of Iranian foreign policy and hope the students to read and analyze them with deep attention.
Document 1. Iran’s Constitution and foreign policy

Article 1

The form of government of Iran is that of an Islamic Republic, endorsed by the people of Iran on the basis of their longstanding belief in the sovereignty of truth and Qur'anic justice, in the referendum of Farvardin 9 and 10 in the year 1358 of the solar Islamic calendar, corresponding to Jamadi al-'Awwal 1 and 2 in the year 1399 of the lunar Islamic calendar (March 29 and 30, 1979], through the affirmative vote of a majority of 98.2% of eligible voters, held after the victorious Islamic Revolution led by the eminent marji' al-taqlid, Ayatullah al-Uzma Imam Khumayni.

Article 2

The Islamic Republic is a system based on belief in:

1. The One God (as stated in the phrase "There is no god except Allah"), His exclusive sovereignty and the right to legislate, and the necessity of submission to His commands;
2. Divine revelation and its fundamental role in setting forth the laws;
3. The return to God in the Hereafter, and the constructive role of this belief in the course of man's ascent towards God;
4. The justice of God in creation and legislation;
5. Continuous leadership (imamah) and perpetual guidance, and its fundamental role in ensuring the uninterrupted process of the revolution of Islam;
6. The exalted dignity and value of man, and his freedom coupled with responsibility before God; in which equity, justice, political, economic, social, and cultural independence and national solidarity are secured by recourse to:
   1. Continuous ijtihad of the fuqaha' possessing necessary qualifications, exercised on the basis of the Qur'an and the Sunnah of the Ma'sumun, upon all of whom be peace;
   2. Sciences and arts and the most advanced results of human experience, together with the effort to advance them further;
   3. Negation of all forms of oppression, both the infliction of and the submission to it, and of dominance, both its imposition and its acceptance.

Article 3

In order to attain the objectives specified in Article 2, the government of the Islamic Republic of Iran has the duty of directing all its resources to the following goals:
16. Framing the foreign policy of the country on the basis of Islamic criteria, fraternal commitment to all Muslims, and unsparing support to the mustad'afîn (poor people) of the world.

**Article 11**
In accordance with the sacred verse of the Qur'an ("This your community is a single community, and I am your Lord, so worship Me" [21:92]), all Muslims form a single nation, and the government of the Islamic Republic of Iran has the duty of formulating its general policies with a view to cultivating the friendship and unity of all Muslim peoples, and it must constantly strive to bring about the political, economic, and cultural unity of the Islamic world.

**Article 145**
No foreigner will be accepted into the Army or security forces of the country.

**Article 146**
The establishment of any kind of foreign military base in Iran, even for peaceful purposes, is forbidden.

**Article 152**
The foreign policy of the Islamic Republic of Iran is based upon the rejection of all forms of domination, both the exertion of it and submission to it, the preservation of the independence of the country in all respects and its territorial integrity, the defense of the rights of all Muslims, non-alignment with respect to the hegemonic superpowers, and the maintenance of mutually peaceful relations with all non-belligerent States.

**Article 153**
Any form of agreement resulting in foreign control over the natural resources, economy, army, or culture of the country, as well as other aspects of the national life, is forbidden.

**Article 154**
The Islamic Republic of Iran has as its ideal human felicity throughout human society, and considers the attainment of independence, freedom, and rule of justice and truth to be the right of all people of the world. Accordingly, while scrupulously refraining from all forms of interference in the internal affairs of other nations, it supports the just struggles of the mustad'afîn against the mustakbirun in every corner of the globe.

**Article 155**.
The government of the Islamic Republic of Iran may grant political asylum to those who seek it unless they are regarded as traitors and saboteurs according to the laws of Iran.


Вопросы:

1. На каких принципах основана политическая система Исламской республики Иран?
2. Каковы цели Ирана во внешней политике согласно конституции?
3. Каким образом конституция определяет взаимоотношения ИРИ с исламскими государствами?
4. Какие правила Конституция Ирана декларирует для иностранных военных баз на территории страны и в отношении контроля иностранных компаний над природными ресурсами государства?
Document2. The Supreme Leader of Iran and foreign policy
(Ideas and ideals of Ayatullah Ali Khamenei)

Ayatollah Ali Khamenei is the Supreme Leader of Iran, after the death of Ayatollah Rouhollah Khomeini who was founder of Iran's Islamic Republic. The fundamental principles of Iran’s foreign policy are determined by Ayatollah Khamenei. Under the Ayatollah Khomeini Iran's foreign policy often emphasized the elimination of foreign influence and the spread of Islamic revolution over state-to-state.

As Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Khamenei has tended to inherit and administer Ayatollah Khomeini’s foreign policy positions rather than break with the past and initiate his own approaches. Though in some cases he has allowed others leeway to initiate alternative policies—such as Rafsanjani’s rapprochement with Saudi Arabia (a government which Ayatollah Khomeini denounced as “evil”) and Khatami’s warming of relations with Europe—he has refused to reverse course on the two chief foreign policy pillars of the revolution, enmity and opposition toward the United States and Israel.

- Ayatollah Khamenei's distrust of the U.S.

Ayatollah Khamenei’s contempt for the United States has been remarkably consistent and enduring. In over three decades of speeches—first as president and later as Supreme Leader—he has very rarely spoken favorably, in public at least, about the United States or the prospect of restoring relations with the U.S. government.

"The Great Satan America is trying to create a global dictatorship and, by trampling on the natural rights of nations, it is the one that has in fact rebelled against the human community and become a rebel country, but it is attributing this characteristic to the honorable Iranian nation. However, if standing up to the world's oppressors and bullies and supporting the oppressed is called rebellion, we feel proud of being a rebel," the Leader told the audience.

"We would by no means accept the behavior of the domineering system. In other words, while we do not intend to exercise dominance and hegemony, we would not submit to domination either, and our diplomacy is characterized by the opposition to the global behavior of the domineering system and by the rejection of the ‘domineering-submissive' paradigm," Ayatollah Khamenei remarked.
Further in his statements, the Leader of the Islamic Republic hinted at the negative propaganda disseminated by the hegemonic powers with the intention of portraying Iran as a rebel country.

U.S.–Iranian relations have undoubtedly grown more adversarial during the Bush administration; in exchange for Iran’s “axis of evil” label, Ayatollah Khamenei has begun referring to the United States as “the devil incarnate.” Nonetheless, Khamenei’s ill-will toward the United States was palpable from the earliest days of the revolution. It was rooted in several factors, both historic and contemporary; namely, Washington’s support of the shah’s government, Israel, and Saddam Hussein during the Iran–Iraq war; its refusal to recognize the Islamic Republic and its meddling in internal Iranian affairs; and the U.S. military presence in the Persian Gulf and supposed desire for global hegemony.

Some assert he is simply ideologically opposed, a subscriber to Ayatollah Khomeini’s maxim that the relationship between the United States and Iran can only be like that between a “wolf and a sheep.” Indeed, Khamenei’s diagnosis of U.S.–Iranian relations appears at times strikingly similar to hardliners in Washington, who believe the two countries represent diametrically opposed ideologies destined for an inevitable confrontation. His address to Iranian government officials in May of 2003—shortly after U.S. forces captured Baghdad—portends an intractable conflict:

“It is natural that our Islamic system should be viewed as an enemy and an intolerable rival by such an oppressive power as the United States, which is trying to establish a global dictatorship and further its own interests by dominating other nations and trampling on their rights. It is also clear that the conflict and confrontation between the two is something natural and unavoidable.” He added:

“What the United States, which has been spearheading the aggression against our Islamic revolution, expects from our nation and government is submission and surrender to its hegemony, and this is the real motive for U.S. claims regarding weapons of mass destruction, human rights or democracy.”

He frequently makes the argument that U.S. opposition to Iran is not because of Tehran’s external behavior—its nuclear ambitions, opposition toward Israel, or support for Hizbollah—but because Iran’s strategic location and energy resources are too valuable to be controlled by an independent-minded Islamic government:
“[Iran] is attracting the attention of this arrogant and aggressor power for several reasons. First of all, Iran is a country rich in natural resources like oil and gas. Second, Iran’s geographical location is of considerable importance, since it has long coasts in the Persian Gulf and the Sea of Oman and is the West’s major gateway to the Central Asia.... Nevertheless, the primary reason for U.S. hostility toward our country is the Islamic identity of our system and the fact that our Islamic system is opposed to oppression, domination, dictatorship and political, economic or cultural dependence on others.”

Washington’s ideological aim, he believes, is to go back to the patron-client relationship with Iran which it enjoyed during the time of the shah:

“The U.S. government has not yet lost its insatiable greed for domination of our country. They are still thinking of restoring their evil domination of Iran, which intensified with the coup [of former Prime Minister Mohammed Mossadegh] on August 19, 1953, and continued until the victory of the Islamic Revolution in 1979. They are still dreaming of the days when the head of state in this country, namely the corrupt and treacherous Mohammad Reza [Pahlavi], made no decisions until he consulted with U.S. officials.”

Ayatollah Khamenei’s perception of U.S. intentions has influenced Iranian foreign and domestic policy in two important ways. First, given that he believes that U.S. policy is still regime change, not behavior change, he holds strongly that Tehran must not compromise in the face of U.S. pressure or intimidation, for it would project weakness and encourage even greater pressure:

“If the officials of a country get daunted by the bullying of the arrogant powers and, as a result, begin to retreat from their own principles and make concessions to those powers, these concessions will never come to an end! First, they will pressure you into recognizing such and such an illegitimate regime, then they will force you not to call your constitution Islamic! They will never stop obtaining concessions from you through pressure and intimidation, and you will be forced to retreat from your values and principles step by step! Indeed, the end to U.S. pressure and intimidation will only come when Iranian officials announce they are ready to
compromise Islam and their popular government of the Islamic Republic and the United States may bring to power in this country whoever it wants!”

“In this context, despite referral to the UN Security Council, heightened sanctions, and military threats from the United States, Iran’s approach to the nuclear issue has been more defiant than ever before. According to Ayatollah Khamenei, this is a concerted strategy: “Rights cannot be achieved by entreating. If you supplicate, withdraw and show flexibility, arrogant powers will make their threat more serious.”

Second, given that Ayatollah Khamenei perceives Washington to be hostile to the Islamic Republic’s very existence, opposition to the United States has arguably become a more important foreign policy priority for the Iranian government than Iran’s immediate national interests. This has motivated Tehran to seek out curious alliances with faraway countries, such as Venezuela and Belarus, and to offer support to groups with whom it has little in common apart from enmity toward the United States.”

Despite Khamenei’s deep mistrust of the United States and the cynicism of the Bush administration, those who are looking for signals of pragmatism can find them. In May 2007 he publicly advocated dialogue with the United States regarding Iraq.

He said: “The talks will only be about the responsibilities of the occupiers in Iraq.... They think the Islamic Republic has changed its firm, logical and defendable policy in rejecting negotiation with the U.S. They are wrong. How is it possible to negotiate with the arrogant, bullying, expansionist and colonialist government of the U.S.?”

More recently, Ayatollah Khamenei made perhaps his furthest-reaching comments regarding the potential for U.S.–Iranian diplomatic relations, closing the door on any relations with the Bush administration, but leaving the door open in the future:

“Cutting ties with America is among our basic policies. However, we have never said that the relations will remain severed forever ... the conditions of the American government are such that any relations would prove harmful to the nation and thereby we are not pursuing them ... any relations would provide the possibility to the Americans to infiltrate Iran and would pave the way for their intelligence and
spy agents ... relations with America has no benefit for the Iranian nation for now. Undoubtedly, the day the relations with America prove beneficial for the Iranian nation I will be the first one to approve of that.”

While Ayatollah Khamenei’s mistrust of the Bush administration and personal animosity towards President Bush are too deep to be overcome, his speeches reflect a growing Iranian confidence that U.S. foreign policy elites are coming to terms with America’s difficulties in Iraq, Iran’s indispensable role in the Middle East, its mastery of the nuclear fuel cycle, and the legitimacy of the Islamic Republican government. Khamenei’s message is that he is amenable to a relationship with an America that has accepted these realities.

Over the years in a few cases, certain people in different administrations have negotiated with them over certain temporary issues and I was not opposed. However, this was done by different administrations, not the Leader. Of course, even those people had a responsibility to observe the Leader’s red lines and today the same responsibility still exists and they should observe the red lines.

“On the basis of our experiences and careful analysis of the existing conditions, our interpretation is that the Americans do not want the nuclear negotiations to end. The Americans do not want the nuclear conflict to be resolved; otherwise if they wanted these negotiations to reach a solution, the solution would be very close by and easy to reach. In the nuclear issue, Iran only wants the world to recognize its right to enrichment, which is Iran’s natural right. Government officials of the countries that are claiming to be after a solution should admit that the Iranian nation has a right to domestic nuclear enrichment for peaceful purposes. Is this too much to expect? This is what we have always demanded, and it is exactly what they do not want [us to have].”

“They say they are concerned that we might go after producing nuclear weapons. The ones who are saying this are no more than a few countries whose names I mentioned earlier, and they call themselves "the global community". They say that the global community is concerned. No, the global community is not at all concerned. The majority of the countries in the world are on the Islamic Republic’s side and they support our demand because it is a legitimate demand.”
“If the Americans wanted to resolve the issue, this would be a very simple solution: they could recognize the Iranian nation's right to enrichment and in order to address those concerns, they could enforce the regulations of the International Atomic Energy Agency. We were never opposed to the supervision and regulations of the International Atomic Energy Agency. Whenever we are close to a solution, the Americans cause a problem in order to prevent reaching a solution. My assumption and interpretation is that their goal is to keep the issue unresolved so that they can have a pretext for exerting pressure on us. And as they themselves said, the purpose of the pressure is to cripple the Iranian nation. Of course, much to the dismay of the enemy, the Iranian nation will not be crippled.”

“This issue is that if the Americans sincerely want to reach a solution, I will give them the solution. The solution is that the Americans should stop being hostile towards the Islamic Republic and the Iranian nation. Offers of negotiation are not a rational and reasonable solution. This is the right solution: they should stop being hostile if they want to put an end to the problems that exist between us - and they announce that they really want to resolve the problems that exist between Iran and America.”

- **Iranian Supreme Leader and Israel**

“We hold a fair and logical stance on the issue of Palestine. Several decades ago, Egyptian statesman Gamal Abdel Nasser stated in his slogans that the Egyptians would throw the Jewish usurpers of Palestine into the sea. Some years later, Saddam Hussein, the most hated Arab figure, said that he would set half of the Palestinian land on fire. We believe, according to our Islamic principles, that neither throwing the Jews into the sea nor setting the Palestinian land on fire is logical and reasonable. Our position is that the Palestinian people should regain their rights. Palestine belongs to Palestinians and the fate of Palestine should also be determined by the Palestinian people.” Ali Khamenei said.

The issue that has featured most prominently in Khamenei’s political discourse over the last two decades is: the Israeli–Palestinian conflict. In contrast to Arab leaders who are accused of paying lip service to the Palestinian cause in order to appease their own populations, Iran’s political leadership does precisely the opposite. Despite the fact that...
the Palestinian issue does not resonate strongly on the Iranian street— Iran is not Arab, has no land or border disputes with Israel, has no Palestinian refugee problem, and possesses the largest Jewish community in the Middle East outside of Israel Iranian leaders, particularly Khamenei, express an unrelenting and obsessive contempt for the Jewish state. Some Iran observers see the Islamic Republic’s militancy toward the Jewish state as less an ideological struggle and more a tactical ploy for Shi’i Persian Iran to be the dominant power in the largely Sunni Arab Middle East. While for some Iranian leaders (perhaps including former president Rafsanjani), the importance of the Palestinian issue has waned since the early days of the revolution, Khamenei’s deep-seated contempt for the “Zionist entity” has shown no signs of weakening. Whereas regarding possible normalized relations with the United States he has allowed room for ambiguity, albeit rarely, his rejection of Israel has been unequivocal. For many close observers of U.S.–Iranian relations the Islamic Republic’s uncompromising stance on Israel represents the greatest impediment to U.S.–Iranian relations. Not only is Khamenei cognizant of this argument, he also agrees with it. Yet it is a bargain he appears unwilling to make:

“The ridiculous accusations such as human rights violations or seeking weapons of mass destruction are only empty claims aimed at exerting pressure on the Islamic Republic, and if Iran stops its support of the Lebanese and Palestinian people, the United States will also change its hostile attitude toward the Islamic Republic.... We consider supporting the Palestinian and Lebanese people one of our major Islamic duties. This is why Washington is applying every pressure lever against the Islamic Republic in order to stop this support.”

He has been outspoken in his opposition to peace talks— including the recent Annapolis meetings — arguing that it is armed struggle, not negotiations, that ultimately brings concessions from Israel:

“Over the past seventy years of their occupation of Palestine, the Zionists have not pulled out of even a single square meter of occupied territories as a result of negotiations ... negotiations have never resulted in the liberation of occupied territories and will never do so in the future either.32 At the same time, however, Ayatollah Khamenei has made a concerted effort to put into context the statements of President Ahmadinejad that Israel should be “wiped off the map.” He has stated
consistently that Iran’s goal is not the military destruction of the Jewish state or the Jewish people, but the defeat of Zionist ideology and dissolution of Israel through a “popular referendum”: There is only one solution to the issue of Palestine, the solution which we suggested a few years ago. This solution is to hold a referendum with the participation of all native Palestinians, including Muslims, Jews and Christians, the Palestinians who live both inside and outside the occupied territories. Any government that takes power as a result of this referendum and based on the Palestinian people’s vote, whether it is a Muslim, Christian or Jewish government or a coalition government, will be an acceptable government, and it will resolve the issue of Palestine. Without this, the Palestinian issue would not be settled.”

- The Vanguard for the Islamic World

From the inception of the Islamic Republic in 1979, Ayatollah Khomeini envisioned that his revolutionary vision of Islamic justice would spread beyond Iran’s borders throughout the Arab and Muslim worlds. While Tehran’s foreign policy approach has become more pragmatic and less revolutionary since Ayatollah Khomeini’s death, under Ayatollah Khamenei’s stewardship Iran continues to aspire to be the vanguard of the Middle East. Khamenei’s strategy for furthering Iran’s regional influence has three important components. The first is to project the narrative that Iran and the Muslim world share the same interests and enemies. For example, to allay Arab concerns about Iran’s nuclear ambitions he frequently notes that Iran’s nuclear achievements belong to the entire Muslim world. At the same time he subtly warns the Arabs against conspiring with the United States against Iran:

“Any success that is achieved by the Iranian nation will reflect honor and credit on the whole Muslim ummah [community]. Likewise, any harm that is inflicted by the enemies on our Islamic system will harm the interests of the whole Islamic world”.

Second is the belief that Iran’s best vehicle to spread its power and influence throughout the region is, ironically, democratic elections. The strong electoral showings of Hamas in Palestine, Hizbollah in Lebanon, the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, and Shi’i co-religionists in Iraq has made Tehran confident that their Islamist friends have won the
battle for the region’s hearts and minds, while Western-oriented liberals are in retreat. Khamenei frequently declares;

“If a referendum is held in any Islamic country, the people will vote for individuals supporting Islam and their national identity and opposing the United States.”

Like many other observers of the Middle East, Khamenei credits Iran for being the catalyst of the “Islamist awakening,” confident that Iran’s “soft power”—its ideology and vision for the Middle East—is shared by the vast majority of the Arab and Muslim street. Defiance of Israel and the United States is certainly useful in this regard:

“A wave of Islamic revival has swept through the Islamic world, and Muslim nations are expressing a strong desire to return to Islam and practice this lofty religion. This awakening has stemmed from the great Islamic revolution of the Iranian people under the leadership of our late magnanimous Imam.... The enemies told us not to export our Islamic revolution! We said that revolution could not be exported, since it is not a commodity! However, our Islamic revolution, like the scent of spring flowers that is carried by the breeze, reached every corner of the Islamic world and brought about an Islamic revival in Muslim nations.”

- The Unity among Muslims

Ayatollah Khamenei’s belief in a cynical American plot to “divide and conquer” the Islamic world has made Muslim unity an important, recurring theme in his political discourse. There is a mistaken belief in some quarters of the West and Arab world that Iran is intent on fomenting sectarian unrest between Sunna and Shi’a in Iraq, Lebanon, and the Persian Gulf. This is a patent misreading of Iranian goals. Given Iran’s ambitions to be the vanguard of the Middle East and the fact that Shi’a constitutes less than ten percent of the region’s Muslims, sectarian unrest is clearly inimical to Iran’s interests to be a pan-Islamic, not just Shi’i, power:

“Ever since the victory of the Islamic Revolution in Iran, the arrogant powers have been trying to portray our revolution as a Shi’i revolution ... [but] if our revolution had been a Shi’i revolution, we would have become separated from the Islamic world and had nothing to do with it. They would have had nothing to do with us either. They would have expressed no hostility to our revolution. But they have noticed that our revolution is an Islamic revolution.”
Khamenei argues that it is not Iran which is seeking war with Sunni Islam, but the United States that is seeking a war with the entire Islamic world. He consistently warns both Iranians and Arab nations that the only two parties that stand to gain from sectarian strife are the United States and Israel:

“[The United States] aims to portray the Islamic Republic of Iran as a Shi’i republic and try to set it against the great Sunni community. This is a very dangerous plot which their politicians are currently trying to carry out.... We should do our utmost to thwart the arrogant powers in their goal. All Muslims should be aware and vigilant. Our nation, our elite and scholars and our dedicated and diligent clergymen should all be careful not to say or do anything that would be conducive to the enemies’ plot.”

He carefully addresses Arab leaders allied with the United States who have warned about the dangers of an ascendant “Shi’i crescent” (King Abdullah of Jordan) or declared that Arab Shi’a are more loyal to Iran than to their own country (President Mubarak of Egypt). He argues that Iran is well known for supporting Sunni Islamist movements, such as Hamas, as robustly as Shi’i organizations, such as Hizbollah. Moreover, he aims to assure Arab leaders that Iran has no territorial or hegemonic ambitions in the Arab world and should be perceived as a big brother rather than an adversary:

“Ever since the victory of the Islamic Revolution, the enemies have been disseminating negative political propaganda against Iran with the intention of making the nations in the region and Arab governments afraid of the Islamic Republic. However, they have seen for more than the past two decades that the Islamic Republic of Iran has waged no aggression against any neighboring or non-neighboring countries. If there was aggression, it was waged by an Arab country against Iran. It was the ill-fated Saddam Hussein that attacked our country first and then invaded Kuwait. He would have attacked other Arab countries as well if he had found an opportunity to do so.”

They should know that the grandeur and dignity of Islam and the power of the Islamic Republic of Iran are to their benefit as well. The United States is taking advantage of the weakness of Islamic countries and is bullying and intimidating their governments. The
United States, while being submissive to the usurper Zionist regime at all times, is bullying and blackmailing certain Arab governments. But if those governments rely on a great power, they will never be forced to submit to the United States.

“Today, the world of Islam is faced with great problems. Unfortunately, we are located in a region in which there are certain problems in countries around us. Many of these problems have been injected and imposed by foreigners. If it was not for the intervention of foreigners, if it was not for the hostile policies of global powers, the events that are taking place in West Asia and North Africa today would definitely not be as complex as they are in the present time. Today, the cure for these problems lies in the fact that nations should make a decision on their own. Others should not intervene. Foreigners should not intervene. This is the only cure for the events that occur in the region today. The same cure can be used for Egypt, Libya and Syria. If foreigners do not intervene and if they do not inject discord, nations can find the way out of such conditions with the wisdom of their own outstanding personalities and with the guidance of their own leaders and wise personalities.

The people of Iran have managed to tread this path with divine blessings and power and with the spirit of faith, unity and solidarity which is available to them in the shade of religion. By Allah's favor, it will be the same in the future. The plot which they hatched in other countries has no effect in our country. They have pitted people and Muslim brothers against one another either with sectarian and tribal conflicts or with partisan conflicts. None of these dangerous and poisonous weapons is useful in Islamic Iran. In Iran, different religions and different tribes have joined hands and different groups and orientations move forward with unity on the most important issues.”

The following is the full text of the speech delivered on January 29, 2013 by Ayatollah Khamenei the Supreme Leader of the Islamic Revolution in a meeting with government officials and foreign participants of the 26th Conference on Islamic Unity:

‘Islamic Awakening is a truth and it has happened. After many decades of domination during which the enemies of Islam and the enemies of Muslims spread their domination over Islamic countries - in the form of direct colonialism,
neocolonialism, indirect colonialism and in the form of cultural, economic and political domination - the core of awakening has grown gradually. And after many years during which the Muslim nations were crushed under the enormous pressure of domination of the west and European and American governments, Islamic Awakening has been established and it is revealing itself. Today, people throughout the world of Islam feel that Islam is their tool for achieving dignity, glory and independence. Thanks to Islam, all the national dreams of a nation can come true in the world of Islam. Thanks to Islam, Islamic nations can stand up against the domination of the west and against the arrogance, oppressive domination and exploitation of western governments.

And the west has to retreat. Today, you can see this in the world of Islam. More than thirty years ago this event took place in Iran. Today, we also see this in the world of Islam such as in North Africa. Steps are taken towards victory. Of course, there are certain problems, but if we remain vigilant, problems cannot create obstacles in our way. The Holy Quran says, "They shall by no means harm you but with a slight evil" [The Holy Quran, 3: 111]. Yes, they harm us and create problems for us. But, if we have determination, rely on God and decide to move forward, they cannot create obstacles in our way.

Today, Islamic nations have awakened. Thanks to Islam, they feel that they can get their message across to the enemies of the world of Islam and the corrupt Zionist network which has established domination over policies of western governments. These victories are very valuable. "Allah promised you many acquisitions which you will take, then He hastened on this one for you". This is part of the divine promise which was fulfilled. "And held back the hands of men from you, and that it may be a sign for the believers and that He may guide you on a right path" [The Holy Quran, 48: 20]. Each victory that a nation achieves against the enemies and against their propaganda and evil tools is a divine testimony and a divine sign: "And that it may be a sign". If you move forward, you will achieve results.

Today the world of Islam is faced with the plots of the enemies. I would tell you dear brothers and sisters - whether Iranian or non-Iranian - that today, the enemy's
most important tool for confronting Islamic Awakening is creating discord. They want to pitch Muslims against Muslims, destroy Muslims at the hands of Muslims and keep them busy with conflicts. What is better than keeping Muslims busy with conflicts for the enemies of Islamic independence? Since the first day that the Islamic Revolution achieved victory, they pursued the policy of creating discord among our nation and our country. But the Islamic Republic stood up against this plot with absolute determination. We announced, our magnanimous Imam (r.a.) announced and the Iranian nation repeatedly stressed - throughout his lifetime and after his demise - that we believe in Islamic brotherhood.”

- The Supreme Leader and Iranian’s Nuclear Program
For Khamenei, the nuclear program has come to embody the core themes of the revolution: the struggle for independence, the injustice of foreign powers, the necessity of self-sufficiency, and Islam’s high esteem for the sciences. Years before Iran’s nuclear ambitions were fully revealed to the public in 2002, Khamenei consistently stressed the importance of scientific and technological progress for Iran’s future, declaring on many occasions that overcoming Iran’s “scientific retardation” is the country’s top priority.
Khamenei sees a clear link between scientific advancement, self-sufficiency, and political independence. His ideal vision is of an Iran that is scientifically and technologically advanced enough to be self-sufficient, self-sufficient enough to be economically independent and economically independent enough to be politically independent. He believes strongly that the United States is not opposed to Iran’s nuclear ambitions because of the proliferation threat, but because of the potential independence and economic leverage that Iran would derive from it:

“They are opposed to the progress and development of the Iranian nation. They do not want an Islamic and independent country to achieve scientific progress and possess advanced technology in the Middle East region, a region which possesses most of the world’s oil and which is one of the most sensitive regions in the world. They are worried about anything that can help the regional nations to achieve independence, self-reliance and self-sufficiency. They want this populous region, which is rich in mineral resources, to be in need of them forever. This is why they are opposed to our possessing modern technology and to our youngsters making
progress in scientific areas. It is hard for the global arrogance to accept that the talented Iranian nation has been able to take great strides in the field of science and technology, especially in the field of nuclear technology. They want Iran’s energy to be always dependent on oil, since oil is vulnerable to the policies of world powers. They aim to control other nations with invisible ropes.”

And though the IAEA confirmed that Iran relied heavily on the A. Q. Khan network, Russia, and China to import and build key nuclear infrastructure and components, Khamenei remarkably states that:

“We are different from those countries that received the technology from the former Soviet Union because they were in the Communist camp. Even China received considerable technological assistance from the former Soviet Union over the first 10 years after its revolution, when the two countries were not at odds yet. However, no country has ever extended any technological assistance to us. We have developed whatever we have ourselves.... We want to produce fuel for our nuclear power plant rather than import it from other countries. What Western countries are saying is that we should not produce nuclear fuel for our Bushehr power plant. They are saying that more nuclear power plants can be built in Iran, provided that we buy the needed nuclear fuel from those countries!”

Source: The Office of the Supreme Leader, Sayyid Ali Khamenei

Вопросы:
1. В чем, по мнению Али Хаменеи, заключается антагонизм в отношениях Исламской Республики Иран и Израиля?
2. Каковы основные причины столкновения политики Ирана и США?
3. Какие идеи выдвингает Али Хаменеи для становления страны в качестве лидера исламского мира?
4. Какие причины Лидер Ирана считает главными в создании кризиса вокруг ядерной программы?
Document 3. Foreign policy of President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad

After winning in the presidential election of 2005, Iran's foreign policy developments were overshadowed by individual variable i.e. character and manner of Ahmadinejad. He brought Iran's foreign policy to the idealism of the early years of Islamic Revolution in Iran and exceeded from the relative realism in the foreign policies of previous administrations.

We may consider the classification of the world into the oppressors and the oppressed and adoption of a confrontational-assertive strategy as the main guide for Ahmadinejad’s foreign policy. Mohammadi, the former deputy of Iranian foreign minister in Ahmadinejad first cabinet and professor of International Relations at Tehran University, believes that Ahmadinejad’s foreign policy may be understood within the framework of dividing the world into two camps: Domination and anti-domination.

In this section, first we examine the most important issues of Iran’s foreign policy during the Ahmadinejad Administration namely, the nuclear issue, Iran’s regional foreign policy, “look to the East” policy and Third-Worldism. The author believes that Ahmadinejad has adopted confrontational-assertive and accommodationist-active foreign policy at the same time. Then we deal with the origins of this new foreign policy orientation. It seems that psychological, social, political, historical and international factors are involved in adopting this policy. The author maintains that Ahmadinejad has adopted an accommodationist-active foreign policy towards non-Western mainly Third World states and an active public diplomacy towards the Western states and people in order to prevent the isolation of Iran which was experienced by the country in early periods of the revolution as the result of a confrontation and assertive foreign policy.

- **Most important Problems and Priorities in Ahmadinejad’s foreign policy**

In August 14, 2002, an Iranian opposition group (MKO) claimed to disclose Iran’s uranium enrichment centers in Natanz and heavy water facilities in Arak. Consequently different states demanded international investigations. This was while in December 13 of the same year, ElBaradei, the former Secretary General of IAEA in an interview with CNN announced that the agency knew about these two facilities. In early 2003, Iran confirmed the existence of enrichment centers in Natanz and heavy water in Arak.
ElBaradei visited Iran and inspected Natanz facilities in February 21, 2003. In a press conference, he confirmed Iran’s claim regarding peaceful usage of nuclear energy. After coming back from Tehran, he presented his report to the board of governors of IAEA in March 17, 2003. In his first written report to the board of governors, ElBaradei asserted that Iran has violated some of its commitments regarding the NPT. In June 2003, in a statement, the board of governors emphasized on the necessity of solving ambiguities and ratifying the protocol attached to NPT by Iran. In August 27, 2003, in a formal letter, Iran declared its readiness to negotiate with IAEA about the protocol. Notwithstanding in September 12, 2003, the first resolution proposed by the European states in the board of governors was approved against Iran in which they requested from Iran to accept the protocol and suspend all of its nuclear activities. In October 21, 2003, the foreign ministers of three European states reached an agreement with Iran about such issues as ratifying the attached protocol by Iran and its enforcement which was published as Sa’ad Abad Declaration. In November 10, 2003, Iran sent IAEA a formal letter in which it declared the acceptance of the attached protocol and in November 21st the board of governors ratified the acceptance of the attached protocol by Iran. In spite of that, in November 26th of the same year, the board of governors approved the second resolution proposed by the European states against Iran’s nuclear activities. In November 18, 2003, Iran signed the attached protocol and enforced it voluntarily. In February 24, 2004, Iran and the European states signed another agreement in Belgium. Notwithstanding, in March 15, 2004, the third resolution proposed by the European states was approved in the board of governors against Iran’s nuclear activities. In May 21, 2004, Iran presented its 1033 pages letter of declaration of its nuclear activities according to the attached protocol. But again in June 18, 2004 and September 18, 2004, the fourth and fifth resolutions were approved against Iran’s nuclear activities. Following negotiations with the European states which resulted in signing the Paris Agreement in November 15, 2004, Iran suspended its activities in Isfahan Uranium Conversion Facility in November 22, 2004. But in November 29th of the same year, the sixth resolution was ratified against Iran.

Iran’s foreign and nuclear policy changed in spring 2005 when Ahmadinejad came to power. Iran’s most significant aim of negotiating with the European states and IAEA was
to maintain its nuclear enrichment cycle and expected its activities such as voluntarily enforcement of the attached protocol and suspension of nuclear enrichment would culminate in recognition of its nuclear rights. But after a while, particularly after Ahmadinejad’s coming to power, Iranian foreign policy officials were convinced that the main goal of the U.S. and Europe was not only the continuation of the suspension but also the end of Iran’s nuclear program, so they decided to change their foreign policy orientation (Chatham House, 2006).

Thus Iran announced that the European countries have not acted according to their commitments mentioned in the Paris Agreement and thus, in a formal letter, declared to the IAEA Secretary General that it would resume the activities in Isfahan Uranium Conversion Facility. Several days after resuming activities in Isfahan UCF, Europe proposed a comprehensive plan to Iran but Iran rejected it because the plan was still emphasizing on stopping fuel cycle activities. Due to resuming activities in Isfahan UCF, the seventh resolution was ratified by IAEA board of governors in which Iran was requested to suspend enrichment. The Iranian government appointed Ali Larijani as the new secretary of National Security Council who replaced HasanRohani. He immediately declared Iran’s decision to continue negotiations with Europe but the three European states cancelled the negotiations. In August 26, 2005, as Iran’s nuclear chief negotiator, Larijani visited Vienna and met ElBaradei. In September 2, 2005, the IAEA presented a report in which it declared that Iran has resumed uranium enrichment in Isfahan nuclear center. In his first speech in the UN General Assembly in September 17, 2005, Ahmadinejad said that Iran would not accept that other states provide its nuclear fuel. He also emphasized on the peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear program and said that producing nuclear weapons is forbidden according to Islamic religious principles. Because Iran had not accepted the EU request for stopping enrichment, the IAEA board of governors issued the eighth resolution in September 24, 2005 in which Iran was asked to resume talks with the three European states, to have the Iranian parliament to approve the attached protocol, and to stop uranium enrichment. It seems that the later resolution paved the way for referring Iran’s nuclear case to the Security Council.

As a consequence, Iran revised its nuclear diplomacy which was based on unconditional cooperation with the IAEA and exclusive talks with the European countries. Iran’s new
nuclear policy was formed on the basis of a multi-layer movement. Firstly Iran declared that it will continue negotiations and cooperation with IAEA but never will negotiate about stopping enrichment. Secondly the Ahmadinejad Administration approved a manual about how foreign states may participate in Iran’s nuclear program in May 24, 2005. In November 20, the Iranian parliament urged the government to stop voluntarily accepted activities, including enforcement of the attached protocol if Iran’s nuclear case was referred to the Security Council. In January 2, 2006, Iran announced that Russia’s plan for enrichment on Russian soil was unacceptable to Iran. In January 3, 2006, Iran declared to IAEA that it would resume R & D activities regarding enrichment. In February 2006, the IAEA urgent session was held and the ninth resolution was ratified against Iran’s nuclear activities. Iran reacted to the resolution by suspending all voluntary cooperation with IAEA including enforcement of the attached protocol. Since that time up until now, the Security Council has issued one declaration and four resolutions against Iran. Ahmadinjead came to the realization that the West would not want to let Iran continue its nuclear activities even within the framework of the NPT. Hence, his administration declared a new approach in dealing with the nuclear issue. As stated by Mottaki, the Iranian foreign minister, the Ahmadinejad Administration designed a new approach regarding the West by assessing sixteen years of Iran’s interaction with the West and using the experience of this interaction. In their book, Hamid Molana, Ahmadinejad’s advisor and Mohammadi, former deputy of Mottaki, say that from Ahmadinejad’s point of view, Khatami’s foreign policy did not enjoy enough power as well as resolve in order to prevent foreign states’ intervention, particularly regarding the nuclear policies. Therefore, the Ahmadinjead Administration tried to avoid passiveness by adopting a confrontational foreign policy. The Ahmadinejad Administration believes that if Iran avoid passiveness and does not surrender to the West’s pressures in this regard and thus, continues enrichment, the West finally retreats.

- Iran’s regional foreign policy

By adopting geographical prioritization of Iran’s foreign policy according to the Constitution, the Ahmadinejad Administration put the improvement and development of relations with regional states as its first foreign policy priority. On this basis, Iran’s
foreign policy in Ahmadinejad Administration has been based on active interaction with neighboring, Islamic and Third World countries. The main priority in this policy was improving relations with the Islamic countries since Ahmadinejad believes that the Islamic Republic of Iran “has Islamic nature, function and responsibility” and on this basis, “regards Islam as the first and main element and source for Iranian national identity”. For instance, Ahmadinejad Administration believed that Iran’s relations with regional states, particularly with the Arab countries of the Persian Gulf, should be developed. President Ahmadinejad personally inclined to develop cooperation with these states. During two years, he visited Saudi Arabia four times. He was also the first Iranian president who visited UAE in 2007. He also visited neighboring countries in Central Asia and Caucasus and announced that Iran is ready to resume diplomatic relations with Egypt. It seems that in this period, Iran sought to firstly develop relations with the regional states, secondly undermine the emerging concerns regarding its nuclear activities, thirdly take stance against allegations based on Iranian hegemonism in the region, particularly those of Iran’s attempt at forming a Shiite Crescent, and finally reach an asymmetrical balance against the U.S. through interaction with the regional states. Of course, it should be considered that Ahmadinejad accepted to negotiate with the U.S. within the framework of solving Iraq problems which was a courageous action because the dominant belief in Iran is to avoid negotiating with the US. During the trilateral negotiations with the U.S., Iran tried to prove its good intentions. Principally, negotiating with the U.S. in Iraq was a kind of breaking taboos inside Iran. Iran sought to show its accommodationist intentions and tried to take the opportunity to improve the bilateral cooperation. This attest to the fact that Iran’s foreign policy in Iraq is guided by pragmatism and is based on strategic issues. Nowadays without considering the kind of government in Iraq, Iran-Iraq relations are guided by such permanent factors such as Iraq ethnic as well as geopolitical features, regional rivalry and some strategic issues remained from the two states’ past relations before the U.S. invasion of Iraq.

But in spite of adopting this accommodationist policy by Iran, it was perceived another way. The Arab states who were concerned with new developments in the Middle East and realized their weakening position, claimed that Iran was forming a Shiite Crescent in the region. In 2004, when Iran’s nuclear crisis was at its zenith and Iraq was moving
towards internal war, Jordan’s King Abdullah, claimed that Iraq war has culminated in forming a Shiite Crescent in the region led by Iran. In fact, two allegations were propounded at the same time. The first was that Shiites have gained power which has resulted in forming a Shiite bloc. The second was that the Shiite bloc will be led by Iran. The Ahmadinejad Administration regards the notion of Shiite Crescent as an attempt for controlling Iran through using ethnic-religious differences in the region. Accordingly, the U.S. wants to erect a regional anti-Iran alliance by using the Shiite Crescent notion, Iran phobia and Shia phobia. Iranian leaders have such a perception of the notion. They have declared that the Islamic Revolution is more Islamic than Shiite and the revolution leaders have emphasized on the unity of the Islamic World. Secondly, Ahmadinejad announced the plan of wiping off Israel from the map and denying Holocaust in 2006 which was apparently raised in order to change the stage of political confrontation with great powers but it faced the West’s drastic reaction. It seems that the designers of the policy believed that the strategy of changing the stage of confrontation may decrease the pressures on Iran over its nuclear issue, give Iran the possibility to choose the stage of confrontation so that it would choose a stage in which the rival is more vulnerable, Iran can show that it would not surrender and if pressured has many options at hand to use. In 2006, the name of Iran in the world was accompanied with Holocaust denial. Meanwhile, the opponents of Iran who seek to accuse it of trying to access the nuclear weapons emphasized that Iran seeks nukes to target Israel. They exploited the Holocaust denial and wiping off Israel from the map and succeeded in making this fantasy more acceptable than before. The Holocaust denial helped Iran’s opponents in Europe and culminated in forming the security atmosphere needed by the U.S. for creating consensus against Iran so the European states easily accompanied the U.S. against Iran. Therefore, Iranian statesmen, including President Ahmadinejad, tried to correct their statements on Holocaust and have repeatedly said that they would ask for “scientific investigation about it” instead of denying it. In sum, Iran’s regional foreign policy during Ahmadinejad has been based on power balancing with the U.S. through supporting Hezbollah in Lebanon, continuing strategic alliance with Syria, supporting the opponents of the U.S. in Afghanistan and Iraq, improving relations with the neighboring countries including the Arab states, and adopting an assertive policy towards Israel. Like any other country
surrounded and threatened by an enemy, Iran would use all its capacities for confronting threats.

- **Iran & Look to the East policy**

The formation of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) in 2001 as the first post-Cold War regional security arrangement arose reactions by regional and trans-regional actors, particularly great powers. Some of important regional and trans-regional actors including Mongolia, India, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Iran and the U.S. have expressed their inclination to join the organization. In 2004, Mongolia was accepted as observing member. In the tenth session during the summit of the leaders in June 2005, the main members of the organization approved the membership of India, Pakistan and Iran as observing members. The main principle of Iran’s foreign policy regarding regional security organizations and treaties which include the great powers has been the principle of rejection. The presence of two regional-global great powers, namely Russia and China in the SCO which were opposing the formation of a unipolar international system was too attractive for Iran to reject. Iran thought that it can guarantee its security through membership in an organization that is obviously against the unipolar system and it is a serious challenge for the U.S. global hegemony. The presence of two permanent members of the Security Council and India as observing member in the organization which is at the same time seeking to become a permanent member of the Security Council has produced a considerable potential for the organization to play a significant role in shaping global developments.

It should be considered that one of Iran’s basic foreign policy goals has been to pay attention to regional cooperation and integration in order to solve regional problems and reach security and economic welfare and development for the nations in the region. But the change in Iran’s old policy based on non-membership in regional security treaties, particularly those in which great powers participate, should have had a profound cause which is the U.S. declining hegemony and formation of a counter-hegemonic organization. In other words, the common interest of Iran and two great powers that are member in the SCO namely Russia and China has culminated in their close bilateral as well as multilateral relations within the context of the SCO.
Iran requested full membership in the SCO because found out that the organization is against unipolar system led by the U.S. During the Khatami Administration, Iran applied for membership in the organization mainly in order to challenge the U.S. hegemony. Although Khatami’s foreign policy was mainly based on interaction with Europe and even the United States, since he believed that Iran’s national interests would be more feasible through constructive relationships with the West, but due to some problems created in later years of his presidency with them (the U.S. announced Iran as “axis of evil” and Iran did not gain a desirable result from nuclear negotiations with Europe), Iran manifested its inclination towards the East.

When Ahmadinejad took power in 2005, Iran’s foreign policy approach changed and the “look to the East” policy was announced which was mainly to balance the West. It seems that Ahmadinejad wanted to be different from the previous government which he regarded as his political antithesis. But it seems that the more significant point was that Ahmadinejad and his supporters believed that the problem of Iran for the West is Iran’s Islamic nature of political system not its policies and behaviors. In other words, Khatami and his colleagues believed that Iran’s foreign policy behavior has caused distrust of different states including the Western ones, and Iran might change the atmosphere by a new gesture and more balanced and cooperative behavior for the sake of confidence building and détente. Hence Khatami proposed the notion of “dialogue of civilizations” and sought detente in order to nurture mutual trust with the Western countries. But Ahmadinejad regards the Western, particularly the U.S., hostility towards Iran as a deeper phenomenon and believes that the U.S. threat to Iran is an existential one so if Iran moderates its policy and behavior towards the West, a just and constructive relations will not form but, as the nuclear negotiation showed, they will enhance their expectations.

- **Policy of Third-Worldism**

According to the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran, the Third World countries do have a specific position in Iran’s foreign policy. When president Ahmdainejad came to power, Iran decided to follow a more assertive/active diplomacy for defending its stances and plans. Therefore, cooperation with the countries of Africa and Latin America became a priority for Iranian foreign policy decision-makers. As the deputy foreign
minister of Iran for African Affairs explains, Iran's policy towards Africa during Ahmadinejad has sought to fulfill the following goals: (1) politically to gain African states’ support in international organizations regarding the nuclear issue and human rights, and develop relations with the African Union and regional organizations (2) economically to increase trade exchanges with Africa, new investment projects in African states, adopt encouraging policies for opening up trade centers in Africa and hold common economic commissions and (3) culturally to expand Islamic culture and introduce Iranian culture and literature in Africa. With respect to Latin America to the main goals of Iran for expanding relationships may be said to include (1) undermining threats around Iran and creating new international trends (2) creating new mutual opportunities and capacities and (3) expanding Iran’s strategic depth. As Molana and Mohammadi acknowledge because of the revolutionary and anti-imperialist nature of Main countries in Latin America particularly Venezuela, Nicaragua, Bolivia and Cuba, “Latin America has the capacity to change international system and Iran may challenge the U.S. hegemony in this way”.

- Origins of Ahmadinejad’s two-pronged foreign policy

Among the factors affecting Iran’s foreign policy to be confrontation-assertive on the one hand and accommodationist-active on the other in Ahmadinejad’s period, we may point out to the following factors: (1) psychological factors, (2) social factors (3) political factors (4) historical factors and (5) international factors. The psychological factor focuses on the President’s personal features, particularly his belief system. It seems that Ahmadnejad is highly similar to late Ayatollah Khomeini. As a pure revolutionary who was affected by Iran-Iraq War experience, Ahmadinejad believes that Iran cannot count on foreign countries, particularly the West including the United States. The Iran-Iraq War clearly demonstrated that the so-called international community not only may violate Iran’s rights, but also international law and conventions, even the UN, may be manipulated in order to provide the great powers’ interests. It seems that the greatest lesson from this war was that Iran should rely on itself. On the other hand, it seems that Ahmadinejad extremely believes that Iran’s enemies, particularly the U.S. and Israel are in a weak stance: the U.S. power is declining and the Israeli government is waning. From this viewpoint, the U.S. stuck in Iraq and the Israeli failure
to annihilate Hezbollah in the Israeli-Lebanese 33 Day War show the fact clearly. This kind of attitude has increased Ahmadinejad’s self-confidence in its foreign policy and move towards being more assertive. The leadership and decision-making style as well as the quality of information management is another personal variant affecting Iran foreign policy. Ahmadinejad and his team believed that they should pave the way for emerging Mahdi (the Shiite religious hero who will come back in Apocalypse) and establish a Utopia in Iran and the world. On this basis, they seek justice and fair international system and try to change the status quo. In this regard, one of Ahmadinejad’s main tactics was to use public diplomacy for establishing communication with world public opinion. In this direction, Iranian media and international tribunes were used to transmit Ahmadinejad’s message to the world. He attended at the universities of other countries in order to communicate with students, held sessions with religious and scientific elite and communicated with ordinary people. Ahmadinejad himself believes that these kinds of communication are more efficient. Hamid Molana an Iranian-American professor of international relations believes that Ahmadinejad has acted as a medium in his speech at Colombia University and succeeded in transmitting his message to millions of people across the world.

The social factor points to the social origin of Ahmadinejad’s statesmen, particularly his main supporters. Contrary to the previous presidents, namely Hashemi and Khatami, who were supported by the middle classes, particularly by intellectuals and businessmen, Ahmadinejad is mainly supported by low class people. While Iranian middle class believed in establishing relations with the West, the low class people do not trust the West, particularly the U.S. This has greatly affected Ahmadinejad’s foreign policy and facilitated his being more assertive.

In his election propaganda, Ahmadianjad said that he is a university teacher and not committed to any political party or group. In fact, he was popular among oppressed, religious and revolutionary people (Molina and Mohammadi, 2008: 133). His supporters regard his victory in 2005 election as a miracle and believe that “Ahmadinejad’s victory in 2005 election showed the bankruptcy of political parties’ structure. Accordingly, the only result of party system is elitism and being far from the nation”.
In 2005, Ahmadinejad expressed his wonder about his victory in election and regarded it as his destiny. On the basis of this destiny, he announced, he should create “the third Islamic Revolution”. In principle, the victory in this revolution was not much related to pragmatist policies and strategies but it was related to divine will. Regarding the impact of political factor on facilitating Ahmadinejad’s foreign policy assertiveness, we may point to three issues. First, it seems that the issue of “being different from Hashemi and Khatami Administrations” was one of effective factors. It can be said that the previous administrations were “others” for Ahmadinejad who tried to be quite different from them. His beliefs in happening of the third revolution by his coming to power, his criticisms of Hashemi, and the dominance of anti-reform discourse after his victory, demonstrate this fact. Secondly, Iranian conservative wing’s hostility towards the West has affected Ahmadinejad’s foreign policy. In sum, we can say that the conservative wing is not only seeking to challenge the West but also does not trust it too. Thirdly, Ahmadinejad and his supporters are mostly veterans of the Iran-Iraq War who have seen the West’s renegade with Iran so they do not believe in its mottoes such as democracy and human rights. They further believe that “development” (Hashemi’s policy) was an American plan seeking to restore the U.S. domination in Iranian culture, politics and economy on the one hand, and “reformists” (Khatami and his colleagues) were also the U.S.-dependent intellectual and political puppets who had only targeted the basis of the Islamic Republic and religious beliefs.

But the historical factor relates to the reality that Iran has traditionally been pessimist towards the West. This issue which has deep historical roots has caused Iranian statesmen generally to be pessimist towards the outside world. This pessimism has affected Iran’s foreign policy in general and after the Islamic Revolution in particular. A brief review of the main principles of Iran’s foreign policy which are highlighted in the Constitution, particularly independence and national sovereignty, demonstrates this deep pessimism. It seems that the issue has manifested itself more in Ahdmadinejad’s Administration. Iranians’ historical memory is full of foreign states’ influence and its damages for the country.

Therefore historical factors affect Iranians’ perception about establishing relations with the superpowers, particularly the U.S. which had a great influence in Iranian politics.
during the reign of Mohammad Reza Shah. “The past is always alive for Iran. A paradoxical combination of pride of Iranian culture and the sense of being sacrificed has caused Iranian people have a drastic sense of independence and resistance against force and domination by alien powers. Iran’s foreign policy has deep roots in these vast feelings”.

And finally, the international community’s particular way of treating the Islamic Republic of Iran, especially the West’s way of dealing with president Khatami, has reinforced Ahmadinejad’s assertive foreign policy. In spite of domestic developments in Iran and the Khatami Administration inclination towards improvement of relations with the outside world, particularly the Western countries and adopting a moderate foreign policy based on détente and peaceful coexistence, Iran was placed in the “axis of evil”. In the nuclear issue, Khatami Administration adopted a moderate stance and suspended enrichment but the Western countries did not reciprocate in at least giving Iran security guarantees.

**Sources:**
Mohammadi, M., The Future of the International System and Iran’s Foreign Policy . 2008 (in Persian), Tehran: IPIS
Mottaki, M.Foreign Policy of the 9th Government.(in Persian), 2006, Tehran: the Center for Strategic Studies,
Molana, H. &Mohammadi M. Foreign Policy of the Islamic Republic of Iran during Ahmadinejad. (in Persian), 2011, Tehran: Dadgostar,
Dehghani, J. Foreign Policy of the Islamic Republic of Iran. (in Persian), 2009, (Tehran: SAMT),
Haji-Yousefi, A., Foreign Policy of Iran in the Shadow of the Regional Developments. 2005 (in Persian), (Tehran: IPIS)

**Вопросы:**
1. Назовите основные приоритеты внешней политики ИРИ в период президентства М. Ахмадинежада.

2. Каковы цели региональной политики ИРИ в указанный период?
3. Раскройте принципы внешнеполитической концепции М.Ахмадинежада «Взгляд на Восток».

4. В чем вы видите Политические и экономические перспективы ИРИ в отношениях со странами «третьего мира»?
**Document 4. President Hassan Rouhani and Iran’s Foreign Policy**

**Hassan Rouhani** (born 12 November 1948) is the 7th President of Iran, in office since 2013. He is also a lawyer, academic and former diplomat. He has been a member of Iran's Assembly of Experts since 1999, member of the Expediency Council since 1991, member of the Supreme National Security Council since 1989, and head of the Center for Strategic Research since 1992.

Rouhani was deputy speaker of the 4th and 5th terms of the Parliament of Iran (Majlis) and Secretary of the Supreme National Security Council from 1989 to 2005. In the latter capacity, was the country's top negotiator with the EU three, UK, France, and Germany, on nuclear technology in Iran. On 7 May 2013, Rouhani registered for the presidential election that was held on 14 June 2013. He said that, if elected, he would prepare a "civil rights charter", restore the economy and improve rocky relations with Western nations.

Rouhani is viewed as politically moderate. As early vote counts began coming in, he took a large lead. He was elected as President of Iran on 15 June. He took office on 3 August 2013. In 2013, TIME magazine named him 9th of the Most Influential People in the World. In the past 16 years, he has watched both the reformist faction, under President Mohammad Khatami, and the conservative faction, under President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, try to go it alone. In both cases, that only led to tension and fissures within the elite. That is why Rouhani has promised to form an inclusive cabinet that attracts the most qualified technocrats from all factions.

Rouhani’s victory is, therefore, likely to gradually shift the balance of power toward the moderate center. He can rely on strong support from pragmatic former president Hashemi Rafsanjani and reformist Khatami, both of whom endorsed his campaign. Rouhani worked for each and is in a good position to unify their supporters by including them in his government. In domestic policy, he encourages personal freedom and free access to information and has been described as a centrist and reformist who has improved Iran's diplomatic relations with other countries.

On the other hand, he won the presidency precisely because he promised to bring a measure of rationality to Iran’s chaotic politics. He pledged to improve Iran’s
deteriorating economic condition, respect human rights, and replace Ahmadinejad’s confrontational foreign policy with one of reengagement with the world.

Foreign policy of Rouhani has been contained by the conservatism of Iranian Principlists, which fear change, while also realizing it is necessary. The main task of Rouhani is only to develop dialogues between Iran and Political rivals including P5+1. This course can help lift sanctions that damaged the Iranian economy. Rouhani seems prepared to take the international goodwill that will follow his cooperation and use it to strike a compromise with the West about Iran’s nuclear program. Although it would be suicidal for him try to halt all enrichment activities, he could agree to make Iran’s nuclear program more transparent and subject it to intrusive international inspection. He might even agree to temporarily halting uranium enrichment up to 20 percent, if he gets sufficient concessions from the West. Khamenei will make the final call, but Rouhani is in a good position to initiate change. He has the mandate of 51 percent of the electorate, the backing of Rafsanjani and Khatami, and an established relationship with the Supreme Leader.

Rouhani’s top foreign policy priority after that would likely be rapprochement with Europe. When he was Iran’s chief nuclear negotiator, Rouhani agreed to temporarily suspend the country’s enrichment activities. That important agreement was negotiated with France, Germany, and the United Kingdom. He is likely to use his connections with the trio to try to lift the sanctions. Overall, Rouhani is no democrat or even a serious reformer. He is a centrist politician, an ultimate insider, with a mission to save the Islamic Republic from itself, improve the economy, prevent a war with the United States, and find a solution to the nuclear impasse. He has to operate in a system that anti-Americanism the key pillar of its foreign policy.

- Iran-United States relations:

Rouhani's visit to New York in September 2013 was hailed as major progress in Iran's relations with the United States. He previously said that his government is ready to hold talks with the United States after thirty two years. However, after U.S. President Barack Obama requested a one-by-one meeting with him, Rouhani rejected it Rouhani denied reports he had refused a meeting with Obama, and felt more time was needed to
coordinate such a meeting. On 27 September 2013, a day after the two countries foreign ministers met during the P5+1 and Iran talks, Rouhani had a phone call with President Obama that marked two countries' highest political exchange since 1979. However, due to this phone call Rouhani was protested by conservatives who chanted "death to America" when he returned to Tehran.

- **Iran-Israel relations**

Rouhani describes Israel as "an occupier and usurper government" that "does injustice to the people of the region, and has brought instability to the region, with its warmongering policies." When asked to clarify his opinion about the Holocaust, Rouhani replied: "... in general, I can tell you that any crime that happens in history against humanity, including the crime the Nazis created towards the Jews as well as non-Jews is reprehensible and condemnable. Whatever criminality they committed against the Jews, we condemn". In an interview with CNN, it was claimed by the CNN translator that Rouhani had acknowledged the existence of the Holocaust, however CNN's statements were accused by Iranian state media as a fabrication created by a deliberate mistranslation by CNN. Other sources, such as the Wall Street Journal, argued that their independent translators corroborated Iranian media's position, and described CNN's translation as highly inaccurate, having added to their translation many words (such as 'holocaust') that he had not said.

**Sources:**

Milani, M. Rouhani's Foreign Policy ;How to Work With Iran's Pragmatic New President.  
http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/139531/mohsen-milani/rouhanis-foreign-policy

**Вопросы:**

1. Дайте характеристику политическому опыту Х. Роухани до его избрания Президентом.

2. Назовите основные внешнеполитические идеи Х. Роухани.
3. Какие изменения произошли в политики ИРИ по отношению к США в период президентства Х. Роухани?
4. Каким образом Х. Роухани оценивает сложившиеся отношения с Израилем?
Document 5. Why Iran seeks constructive engagement
By Hassan Rouhani Washington Post Sep 19, 2013

Three months ago, my platform of “prudence and hope” gained a broad, popular mandate. Iranians embraced my approach to domestic and international affairs because they saw it as long overdue. I’m committed to fulfilling my promises to my people, including my pledge to engage in constructive interaction with the world.

The world has changed. International politics is no longer a zero-sum game but a multidimensional arena where cooperation and competition often occur simultaneously. Gone is the age of blood feuds. World leaders are expected to lead in turning threats into opportunities.

The international community faces many challenges in this new world — terrorism, extremism, foreign military interference, drug trafficking, cybercrime and cultural encroachment — all within a framework that has emphasized hard power and the use of brute force.

We must pay attention to the complexities of the issues at hand to solve them. Enter my definition of constructive engagement. In a world where global politics is no longer a zero-sum game, it is — or should be — counterintuitive to pursue one’s interests without considering the interests of others. A constructive approach to diplomacy doesn’t mean relinquishing one’s rights. It means engaging with one’s counterparts, on the basis of equal footing and mutual respect, to address shared concerns and achieve shared objectives. In other words, win-win outcomes are not just favorable but also achievable.

A zero-sum, Cold War mentality leads to everyone’s loss.

Sadly, unilateralism often continues to overshadow constructive approaches. Security is pursued at the expense of the insecurity of others, with disastrous consequences. More than a decade and two wars after 9/11, al-Qaeda and other militant extremists continue to wreak havoc. Syria, a jewel of civilization, has become the scene of heartbreaking violence, including chemical weapons attacks, which we strongly condemn. In Iraq, 10 years after the American-led invasion, dozens still lose their lives to violence every day. Afghanistan endures similar, endemic bloodshed.
The unilateral approach, which glorifies brute force and breeds violence, is clearly incapable of solving issues we all face, such as terrorism and extremism. I say all because nobody is immune to extremist-fueled violence, even though it might rage thousands of miles away. Americans woke up to this reality 12 years ago.

My approach to foreign policy seeks to resolve these issues by addressing their underlying causes. We must work together to end the unhealthy rivalries and interferences that fuel violence and drive us apart. We must also pay attention to the issue of identity as a key driver of tension in, and beyond, the Middle East.

At their core, the vicious battles in Iraq, Afghanistan and Syria are over the nature of those countries’ identities and their consequent roles in our region and the world. The centrality of identity extends to the case of our peaceful nuclear energy program. To us, mastering the atomic fuel cycle and generating nuclear power is as much about diversifying our energy resources as it is about who Iranians are as a nation, our demand for dignity and respect and our consequent place in the world. Without comprehending the role of identity, many issues we all face will remain unresolved.

I am committed to confronting our common challenges via a two-pronged approach. First, we must join hands to constructively work toward national dialogue, whether in Syria or Bahrain. We must create an atmosphere where peoples of the region can decide their own fates. As part of this, I announce my government’s readiness to help facilitate dialogue between the Syrian government and the opposition.

Second, we must address the broader, overarching injustices and rivalries that fuel violence and tensions. A key aspect of my commitment to constructive interaction entails a sincere effort to engage with neighbors and other nations to identify and secure win-win solutions.

We and our international counterparts have spent a lot of time — perhaps too much time — discussing what we don’t want rather than what we do want. This is not unique to Iran’s international relations. In a climate where much of foreign policy is a direct function of domestic politics, focusing on what one doesn’t want is an easy way out of difficult conundrums for many world leaders. Expressing what one does want requires more courage.
After 10 years of back-and-forth, what all sides don’t want in relation to our nuclear file is clear. The same dynamic is evident in the rival approaches to Syria. This approach can be useful for efforts to prevent cold conflicts from turning hot. But to move beyond impasses, whether in relation to Syria, my country’s nuclear program or its relations with the United States, we need to aim higher. Rather than focusing on how to prevent things from getting worse, we need to think — and talk — about how to make things better. To do that, we all need to muster the courage to start conveying what we want — clearly, concisely and sincerely — and to back it up with the political will to take necessary action. This is the essence of my approach to constructive interaction.

As I depart for New York for the opening of the U.N. General Assembly, I urge my counterparts to seize the opportunity presented by Iran’s recent election. I urge them to make the most of the mandate for prudent engagement that my people have given me and to respond genuinely to my government’s efforts to engage in constructive dialogue. Most of all, I urge them to look beyond the pines and be brave enough to tell me what they see — if not for their national interests, then for the sake of their legacies, and our children and future generations.

**Source:**


Вопросы:

1. Каковы основные идеи внешнеполитической концепции Х. Роухани «Конструктивное взаимодействие»?
2. Найдите взгляды президента Ирана на основные вызовы и угрозы в сфере современных международных отношений.
3. Какую оценку дает президент Ирана современной политике США на Ближнем Востоке?
Document 6. What Iran Really Wants?

By Iran's Foreign Minister; Mohammad Javad Zarif

Foreign policy is a critical component in the lives, conduct, and governance of all nation-states. But it has become even more significant in recent years as interstate relations have grown ever more complex. The inexorable rise in the number of international players including; multilateral organizations, non state actors, and even individuals has further complicated policymaking. Meanwhile, the ongoing process of globalization, however conceived and defined, whether lauded or despised has brought its inescapable weight to bear on the foreign policies of all states, whether large or small, developed or developing. Since its establishment by a popular revolution in 1979, the Islamic Republic of Iran has grappled with these challenges. The post revolutionary foreign policy of Iran has been based on a number of cherished ideals and objectives embedded in the country’s constitution. These include the preservation of Iran’s independence, territorial integrity, and national security and the achievement of long-term, sustainable national development. Beyond its borders, Iran seeks to enhance its regional and global stature; to promote its ideals, including Islamic democracy; to expand its bilateral and multilateral relations, particularly with neighboring Muslim-majority countries and nonaligned states; to reduce tensions and manage disagreements with other states; to foster peace and security at both the regional and the international levels through positive engagement; and to promote international understanding through dialogue and cultural interaction.

- Iran In The Multilateral Era

Since the end of the Cold War and the demise of the bipolar world in the early 1990s, the global order has undergone a major structural transformation. But a firm new order has not yet emerged. As was the case during other transitions in the past, the fluid, complex, and uncertain state of international affairs today is extremely perilous and challenging. Previous transitions were usually complicated by military rivalries and even outright war among the dominant powers of the time. Today’s rivalries are similarly quite intense. However, due to a number of factors -- the substantially changed global environment,
changes in the nature of power, and the diversity and multiplicity of state and non-state actors -- competition these days mostly takes a nonmilitary form.

- **Our Neighbors are our Priority**

In the past few weeks, the Islamic Republic of Iran and the P5+1 have endeavored to make use of the unique window of opportunity provided by the Iranian presidential election this past summer to resolve the nuclear issue, which has unnecessarily cast a shadow of insecurity and crisis over the region. While most in the international community welcomed this positive development, some of our friends in our immediate neighborhood have expressed concerns that this opening may be pursued at their expense. Regrettably, a zero-sum mentality has been prevalent both in our region and around the world, and some may have even grown accustomed to taking advantage of hostility to Iran to pursue their interests. Still, I wish to reiterate that the Islamic Republic of Iran does not have any such illusions. We recognize that we cannot promote our interests at the expense of others. This is particularly the case in relation to counterparts so close to us that their security and stability are intertwined with ours. Thus, notwithstanding the focus on our interactions with the West, the reality is that our primary foreign policy priority is our region.

Few things are constant in international politics, but geography is among them. A country cannot change its neighbors. In our interconnected world, the fate of one nation is tied to the destinies of its neighbors. The body of water that separates us from our southern neighbors is not just a waterway—it is our shared lifeline. All of us depend on it, not just for survival, but to thrive. With our fates so closely tied together, the belief that one’s interests can be pursued without consideration of the interests of others is delusional. As the turmoil in our region evidences, no country is an island. Prosperity cannot be pursued at the expense of others’ poverty, and security cannot be achieved at the expense of the security of others. We will either win together or lose together. We are capable of working together, trusting one another, combining our potential, and building a more secure and prosperous region.

Sadly, the model for security and stability that has to date been imposed on our region has been one based on competition, rivalry and the formation of competing blocs. The
only outcome has been the fostering of fresh imbalances and the emergence of unrealized or unstated ambitions that have repeatedly menaced the region over the past three decades.

So how do we move forward?
We must pinpoint areas of common interest and shared objectives. Then, we must find cooperative methods for achieving and maintaining those objectives.

There is far more that joins us than separates us. We need to have a sober appreciation of the fact that we have common interests and face common threats, and that we need to deal with common challenges and can make use of common opportunities. In short, we have a common destiny.

We all have an interest in preventing tension in our region, curbing extremism and terrorism, promoting harmony between various Islamic sects, preserving our territorial integrity, assuring our political independence, ensuring the free flow of oil, and protecting our shared environment. These are absolute imperatives for our common security and development.

To reverse the vicious cycle of suspicion and mistrust and move forward—to build confidence, and join forces in striving to build a better, more secure and more prosperous future for our children—it is imperative that we keep three points in mind.

First, it is crucial that we build an inclusive framework for confidence and cooperation in this strategic region. Any exclusion will be the seed of future mistrust, tension and crisis. The core of any wider regional arrangement should be limited to the eight littoral states. Inclusion of other states will bring with it other complex issues, overshadowing the immediate problems of this region and further complicating the complex nature of security, as well as cooperation among us.

Naturally, there are legitimate concerns about potential imbalances and asymmetries that might arise within a new system. Concerns about the domination or imposition of the views of any single country or group of countries must be taken into account and addressed. To build an inclusive system based on mutual respect and the principle of non-interference, we should envisage arrangements within the framework of the United Nations. The necessary institutional framework has already been provided in Security
Council Resolution 598, which ended the disastrous war imposed by Saddam Hussein on Iran, Iraq and the entire region.

Second, we need to be clear that while our cooperation is not at the expense of any other party, and will in fact promote greater security for all, we are very much cognizant of the variety of interests involved in our region. The waterway that divides us is vital for the world, but the source of its importance is not identical for all actors. For us littoral states, it is our lifeline. For those who are dependent on us as major suppliers of their energy requirements, it constitutes a major element in their economic and industrial wellbeing. In contrast, for those who do not depend on our energy resources, our region is merely an important theater for extending their control in the international political arena and in international economic competition. Hence, we must bear in mind that there is a qualitative difference between the interests of the various players involved, and act accordingly.

Third, the international element of the instability in our region stems from the divergence of the nature of the interests of various outside powers and their competition. Their injection of extraneous issues only complicates an already complex security situation further. We must not forget that the paramount interest of such outside players may not always be stability, but in fact may depend on what can justify their presence. The presence of foreign forces has historically resulted in domestic instability within the countries hosting them and exacerbated the existing tensions between these countries and other regional states.

I am convinced that there is a genuine will to discuss these common challenges. The challenges and opportunities that we face are enormous. They range from environmental degradation to sectarian tension, from extremism and terrorism to arms control and disarmament, and from tourism and economic and cultural cooperation to confidence-building and security-enhancing measures. We must aim to initiate dialogue that results in practical and gradually expanding steps.

Iran, content with its size, geography, and human and natural resources, and enjoying common bonds of religion, history and culture with its neighbors, has not attacked anyone in nearly three centuries. We extend our hand in friendship and Islamic solidarity to our neighbors, assuring them that they can count on us as a reliable partner.
In our recent presidential election, which was a proud manifestation of the ability of an Islamic model of democracy to bring about change through the ballot box, my government received a strong popular mandate to engage in constructive interaction with the world, and particularly with our neighbors. We are dedicated to making use of this mandate to instigate change for the better, but we cannot do it alone. Now, more than ever, is the time to join hands to work towards securing a better fate for all of us; a destiny based on the noble principles of mutual respect and non-interference. We are taking the first steps towards this objective. We hope you will join us in this difficult, but rewarding, path.

Source:

Foreign Affairs // http://www.foreignaffairs.com/print/138245

Вопросы:

1. Какие периоды внешней политики Ирана называет министр М.Зариф?
2. Каковы основные приоритеты внешней политики ИРИ в отношении соседних государств, по мнению министра иностранных дел?
3. На каких принципах строится современная внешняя политика Ирана?

The Fourth Plan covers the periods of 2005 to 2010 and since ratified by the Parliament, has the force of law in Iran. The following are some of the highlights of the Fourth Plan:

1. **Government Investments**
   The Fourth Plan mandates the government and government companies to cease investing in and/or withdraw from investments in areas in which the private sector can be engaged. In this regard, state-owned companies may only participate in activities where:
   • The government hold exclusive presence in form of monopoly; or
   • The private sector has no incentive to partake in that activity.
   Similar to the Third Plan, new government companies may be established only pursuant to the permission of the parliament. It should be noted that under Iranian laws, government companies are those that are majority-owned (more than 50%) by the government or government instrumentalities. Further, changing companies that are less than 50% owned by the government to a government company, is not permitted. That means, without legal permission, the government company may not acquire more than 50% of the shares of a private company, as it would ultimately classify the latter as a government company. Further, participation and investment of government companies – with the exception of banks, insurance and investment companies – in other government companies requires the permission of the cabinet. Finally, the Fourth Plan clearly provides for the first time that when the government holds less than 50% shares of a company, that company will be exempt from application of regulations and laws pertaining to government companies.

2. **Foreign Currency Policy and Transactions**
   Government entities are required to conduct all of their foreign currency transactions through banks and foreign currency accounts that have been approved by the Central Bank of Iran ("CBI"). Further, new foreign currency accounts outside of the country can only be maintained upon approval of the CBI. The government is also required to schedule repayment of all short and long term foreign debts and obligations in such manner that during the last year of the Fourth Plan the annual installment of such debts
and obligations (without considering buy back obligations) does not exceed more than 30% of the foreign currency earnings of the government. Furthermore, the amount of foreign obligations and debts of the government shall not exceed more than US $30 Billion at the last year of the Fourth Plan. Commercial and specialized banks are permitted to obtain foreign finance facilities for the non-government sector, providing that the above ceilings are observed and no government guarantees are required. In those cases where executive organs of the government utilize foreign financing for their investment projects, the observance of the following guidelines is necessary:

• The minister or highest organ of the entity must take responsibility for the plan and obtain the approval of the Economy Council. Such investments must have financial, technical and economic justification and must comply with local content requirements;
• Prior to execution of the agreement, the permission of the Management and Planning Organization must be obtained;
• All transactions and contracts in excess of US $1,000,000 must comply with local content law requirements, as well as being conducted through limited and/or international tenders. Exceptions can only be granted through a special committee. The CBI is permitted to provide provisions only for those obligations that are in compliance with the foregoing and have the confirmation of the relevant minister or highest executive in that organ.

3. Oil and Gas

In order to increase oil production, maintain and improve Iran's OPEC position, and attract foreign investment and resources in the upstream oil and gas, among others, NIOC is permitted to conclude contracts with foreign persons or qualified domestic companies for exploration and development of fields under the following conditions:

(i) Maintaining and exercising government's ownership over the oil and gas resources of the country;
(ii) Requiring no government, CBI or governmental bank guarantees assuring the undertakings by the government;
(iii) Paying the original investment, interest, risks and expenses associated with finance and all other related expenses for carrying out the project from the sale of the products of the said field based on market prices at the time of sale of the products;
(iv) Contractors accepting the risks associated with not reaching the goals of the contract, non commerciality of the field, or insufficiency of the products for remunerating contractors;

(v) Determining the rate of return for contractors based on the conditions of each project and with purpose of creating incentives for utilization of superior methods for exploration, development, and exploitation;

(vi) Guaranteeing preservation of oil and gas reserves for the duration of the contract;

(vii) Complying with local content laws of Iran;

(viii) Observing and complying with environmental laws and regulations Specifically, NIOC has been permitted to conclude contracts for increasing crude oil production by one million barrels per day and 250 million cubic meters of natural gas and to repay the contractual obligations from each project exclusively from the excess production of each project. NIOC is also permitted to conclude contracts for collecting accompanying gas, injection of gas, renovation and renewal of oil establishments, conversion of natural gas to liquid products (i.e. DME, GTL, and LNG) and repayment of its obligations from excess products of those projects themselves.

The Fourth Plan also provides authorization to NIOC to conclude exploration and exploitation contracts with third parties including foreign entities, for the purpose of increasing oil and gas capacity as mentioned earlier. The conditions for such contracts are as the following:

• All risks of finding commercial fields are with the contractor;

• All direct and indirect costs of exploration and exploitation of such fields shall be repaid from the sale of products of those fields;

• The issued permits have time limits and can be renewed only once;

• In circumstances where no commercial field is discovered after the exploration period, the contract will be deemed to be terminated and the contractor will have no right for reimbursement whatsoever. The Fourth Plan also reauthorizes the provisions of the Third Plan, allowing for the building of and ownership of downstream refineries by foreign and domestic persons. Moreover, the government has been obliged – while maintaining ownership – to transfer at least 10% of activities concerning exploration, exploitation and
production of oil and gas, refining, distribution and transportation of oil products to the domestic private sector.

4. Insurance
The government is authorized to transfer its shares in government insurance companies to the private and cooperative sector.

5. Government Guarantees
Under Iranian law, government guarantees require legal permission. The Fourth Plan has provided for limited such guarantees concerning those investments made under Article 3(b) of the Foreign Investment Promotion and Protection Act ("FIPPA"). In this regard, the Fourth Plan authorizes the government to guarantee payment of all obligations of government entities where the products of the project can only be purchased by the government. The government shall undertake measures to make payment from there sources of the contracting government entity itself. Other public funds shall not be utilized in connection with the mentioned guarantees. Also, the guarantee cannot cover commercial risks or faults attributable to the investor.

6. Power Generation
The authority granted under the Third Five Year Plan concerning the establishment and ownership of new power plants by foreign and domestic persons has been carried over to the Fourth Plan. In addition, the government has authorized to accede at least 10% of its activities concerning the production and distribution of power, to the private domestic persons.

7. Telecommunications
The Fourth Plan does not extend the authority to the private sector to participate in activities concerning the mobile network. In other words, under the current plan, no operator may be engaged in providing such services other than the government. It should be noted that this would not undermine the authority granted by the Third Plan concerning the existing consortium led by Turkcell to be the second operator and currently under scrutiny of the parliament. However, as of March 2004, the entry of new operators would be possible only through new legislation.

8. Transportation
Absent in the Fourth Plan is the authority granted under its predecessor concerning the management of the country's airports by foreign contractors. Based on the Fourth Plan the security forces shall be solely responsible for the security management of the airports. The government is authorized to offer to the non-government sector, up to 49% of the shares of Iran Air Company.

9. Foreign Trade

Government policies for the promotion of non-oil exports have to be continued under the Fourth Plan. Export of non-oil products shall be exempt from any permit requirements (except for mandatory standards) and from payment of taxes and duties. However, the government is authorized to impose duties on the export of unprocessed raw materials. The goal is to reach an annual increase of 10.3% in the non-oil exports of the country. The government shall eliminate all non-tariff and non-technical barriers on the import of goods by the end of the first year of the Fourth Plan. However the government is authorized to put into practice antidumping measures, as and if necessary. Also, the government is required to amend the Import-Export laws, Customs Act, regulations of free trade zones, and draft antidumping laws. All business concerns are required to comply with the regulations of the Ministry of Commerce that shall be drafted for the renovation of the distribution networks of the country in order to facilitate Iran’s admission to the WTO.

10. Corporate Affairs

Taking into account that the Commercial Code does not provide for merger and amalgamation of companies, the Fourth Plan provides legal permission for such. Based on this authority, a merger shall be approved by four fifth of the shareholders of the merging companies. Upon merger, the new company will become the successor-in-interest to the former companies. This means, all of the assets and debts of the merged companies will be automatically transferred to the new company and the employees of the former companies will become employees of the new company. However, surplus workforce can be terminated with the agreement of the employees unions or with the approval of a special committee consisting of the representatives of the government, employers and employees.

11. Labor Issues
The government is required to amend the current Labor Law with the following purposes:

• To transfer social security affairs from Labor Law to the Law of Social Security;
• To provide for more flexible processes for settlement of disputes between employees and employers; and
• To provide for specific provisions for different economic sectors.

12. Antimonopoly
The government is required to draft the antimonopoly law and send it for the approval of the parliament by the end of the first year of the Fourth Plan.

13. Intellectual Property
Taking into account the legal gap in the field of the intellectual property laws and copy rights, the Fourth Plan requires government to establish a comprehensive structure for protection of intellectual property. This can involve new legislations and regulations that recognize copy rights, patents and other intellectual property.

14. Environment
Further to certain requirements for the Government to promote the environmental conditions and adopt protective measures, the Fourth Plan provides for the establishment of a self-declaration system. Based on this system, pollution making units may be compelled to provide periodic reports about their environmental situation and the extent of the pollution they emit into the environment.

15. Foreign Currency Rates
The government shall maintain the controlled floating rate method to supervise over the exchange rates. Based on this method, the government does not declare any official (mandatory) exchange rate but manipulates the market to prevent big fluctuations.

Source:

Вопросы:
1. Какими интересами руководствуется Ирана в международных экономических отношениях?
2. Назовите принципы сотрудничества Ирины с другими государствами в нефтегазовой сфере?
3. В чем заключается иностранная денежная политика Ирана?

Cultural Affairs
1) Completing and implementing an engineering-cultural plan and preparing a cultural connection for important plans.
2) Keeping alive the religious and political ideas of Imam Khomeini (God’s mercy be upon him!) and emphasizing their role as a fundamental criterion in all policy making and planning.
3) Strengthening the rule of law, social discipline, scrupulousness, spirit of social work, initiative, proper conduct, satisfaction, avoidance of waste, and focus on the quality of production.
4) Confronting deviant currents in the religious seminaries and reducing superstition.
5) Using the optimal intelligence and social technology to achieve the system’s cultural ends.
6) Creating a common understanding of the Twenty Year Perspective and strengthening national belief and determination for achieving it.

Scientific and Technical Affairs
7) Development in the higher educational and research system in the following fields:
   a. Increasing the research budget to 3% of GDP by the end of the Fifth Plan and increasing the entry of college graduates of undergraduate programs to the graduate level by 20%.
   b. Reaching second place in science and technology in the region and stabilizing it in the Fifth Plan.
   c. An effective relationship between the universities and research centers with industry and sectors connected to society.
   d. Enabling the non-governmental sector to participate in scientific and technical production.
   e. Gaining access to needed advanced technologies.
8) Developing the educational system to raise its quality based on the country’s needs and priorities in the three spheres of education, skills, and upbringing as well as improving teachers’ spiritual and physical health.

9) The development and improvement of the humanities by strengthening their prestige, attracting capable and motivated individuals, reforming and revising their educational pillars, programs, and policies, improving the quantity and quality of research centers and activities and fostering theorizing, criticism, and free thought.

10) Distributing material and moral aid for distinguished scientific and technical inventors through
   a. Raising their social prestige;
   b. Raising the level of science and skill;
   c. Removing concerns about financial risk in stages of inventors’ research and experimentation and aid in marketing their results.

11) Completing and implementing an inclusive national scientific plan.

Social Affairs

12) Strengthening the institution of the family and the position of women therein and in the social sphere, and fulfilling the rights of women under sharia and law in all fields, with particular attention to their constructive role.

13) Strengthening the national character of the youth in relation to the Islamic revolution’s aspirations, presenting them with an atmosphere for intellectual and scientific development and striving to eliminate concerns about employment, marriage, housing, and their social suffering, with attention to the exigencies of youth and their needs and abilities.

14) Reforming the administrative and legal system in order to
   a. Increase its flexibility and efficiency;
   b. Increase it delivery of services to the people;
   c. Secure the dignity and wellbeing of its employees;
   d. Employing worthy and trusty managers and judges and guaranteeing them employment;
   e. Removing or merging superfluous parallel administrations;
   f. Emphasizing decentralization in administrative and executive spheres;
g. Preventing administrative corruption and struggling against it; and
h. Drafting the necessary laws.
15) Lending character to the features of city and countryside, reconstructing and maintaining Iranian-Islamic buildings, observing advanced criteria for making buildings, saving and fortifying structures.
16) Strengthening a system of inspection and supervision and putting it into operation, reforming laws and stipulations with the intention of removing overlaps between the duties of supervisory and inspection institutions.
17) Prioritizing martyrs of the Islamic Revolution in matters of financial sources and opportunity and resources and government responsibilities in various cultural and economic fields.
18) Commitment to developing exercise and supporting the spread of tourism, emphasizing pilgrimages.
19) Emphasizing every facet of a lifestyle of a healthy man:
   a. Unity in setting policy, planning, evaluation, supervision, and allocating public resources.
   b. Raising indicators of clean air, safe food and environment, and physical and mental health.
   c. Reducing health-threatening pollution.
   d. Improving the way society is fed through improving the composition and soundness of food.
   e. Quantitative and qualitative development of health insurance and reducing the people’s share of the cost of health to 30% by the end of the Fifth Plan.
20) Increasing social security:
   a. An all-sided struggle against addictive and psychoactive substances and attention to implementing general policies in the struggle against addictive substances.
   b. Reorganizing slums and pursuing and controlling social inequalities resulting from them.
   C. Utilizing cultural, educational, and media tools to pursue and confront cultural and social inequalities.

Economic Affairs
A) An appropriate economic development based on:
21) Achieving a sustainable and vibrant economic growth at a rate of at least 8% of GDP with
   a. A development of investment through a reduction of the savings gap, i.e., investment while maintaining the proportion of savings to GDP at at least 40% and attracting sources of foreign investment;
   b. Raising the rate of profit in economic growth by a third by the end of the Fifth Plan;
   c. Improving the country’s trade atmosphere based on a stabilization of the macroeconomic atmosphere, providing the necessary communication, information, legal, and scientific and technological substructure, reducing macroeconomic risk, regularly preparing figures and information to society in a transparent and systematic fashion.
   d. Strengthening and developing a standard national system.
22) Changing the perspective on oil and gas and the income obtained there from to becoming a resource and capital for economic vitality, instead of a source to secure the public budget, and creating a National Development Fund whose budget is to be ratified by the Islamic Consultative Assembly in the first year of the Fifth Program, planning to use the relative profit of oil and gas in an industrial and service chain and reducing dependency on them, following the criteria:
   a. Investing at least 20% of the annual resources obtained from the export of oil and gas and their derivatives into the National Development Fund;
   b. Easing access to the private, the cooperative, and the non-state public sectors for the National Development Fund’s resources with the aim of producing and developing investment domestically and abroad, taking into consideration conditions of competition and appropriate economic returns.
   c. Cutting the dependency of the government’s current expenses on oil and gas income by the end of the plan.
23) Reforming the banking system’s structure through a thorough implementation and repair of the law of interest-free banking, institutionalizing free loans, and securing microcredit and the necessary credit for major investments.
24) Quantitatively and qualitatively improving financial markets (capital, money, and insurance), emphasizing efficiency, transparency, and soundness.
25) Achieving the general policies of Article 44 of the Constitution and the requirements related to each of its sections, emphasizing:
a. Support for the formation of competitive markets;
b. Creating relevant structures for fulfilling governing duties (policy making, leadership, and supervision);
c. Drafting policies to encourage unorganized activities (family institution) into salaried unit activities.
d. Creating a competitive market for offering medical insurance services.

26) Attention to the economic, security, and environmental value of water in accelerating its usage, supplies, preservation, and consumption and keeping water from leaving the country, prioritizing the joint use of aquatic resources.

27) Investing in the joint extraction of gas and oil and mines with neighboring countries based on the general political criteria of Article 44 of the Constitution.

28) Maintaining a strategic financial reserve sufficient to secure the country’s basic needs in a fixed period (as determined by the Supreme Council of National Security.)

29) Emphasizing a strategy of export development, particularly in the high tech service sector, in such a way that the non-oil balance of trade will be reduced and a balance of trade in services will be created.

30) An all-sided development of cooperation with the countries in the South Asian region in trade, investment, and technology.

31) Promoting and coordinating among the development goals of education, health, and employment, in such a way that by the end of the Fifth Plan the indicators of human development will reach those of the countries with high human development.

32) Transforming the country’s budget system to operational budgeting.

33) Establishing qualitative and quantitative relations between the Five Year Plan and the annual budgets with the document Perspectives, based on the criteria of transparency and supervisibility.

B) The spread of social justice by:

34) Organizing all activities related to economic growth and development based on social justice, decreasing the difference between the classes’ incomes and eliminating deprivation from low-income layers based on the following points:
a. Compensating for unjustified inequalities in income through tax policies, giving grants, and insurance mechanisms.
b. Completing an information bank relevant for the lower two deciles in income and continuing to update them.
c. Giving public grants and gradually implementing non-public grants.
d. Securing a uniform social use of economic information.

35) Taking the requisite measures to compensate for backwardness stemming from past historical ages, emphasizing
a. Raising the level of income and living standards of the villagers and farmers by preparing village development plans and developing industrialization, village industries, new services and a reform of the system of pricing agricultural goods.
b. Spreading economic activities in border areas and the southern shores and islands, taking advantage of the country’s foreign trade potential.
c. Reducing the gap between society’s two highest and lowest deciles of income so that the Gini coefficient will be at most .35 at the end of the program.
d. Taking the measures necessary for reducing the country’s unemployment rate to 7%.
e. Guaranteeing comprehensive and effective insurance and a qualitative and quantitative development of the social security system and medical insurance services.
f. Supporting deprived groups and female heads of households.
g. Developing the cooperative sector with the goal of strengthening the social groups with middle and lower incomes so that the cooperative sector will reach 25% [of the economy] by the end of the Fifth Plan.

Political, Defense, and Security Affairs

36) Strengthening the people’s presence and participation in the political, social, economic, and cultural fields.

37) Orienting political currents to cleave to Islamic revolutionary values, the defense of the national interest, weakening the enemy, accepting the rule of law, and moral values.

38) Supporting legitimate freedoms and preserving the nation’s basic rights.

39) Raising the prestige, status, power, and role of the Islamic Republic of Iran in the region and the international system in order to strengthen national security and advance the national interest, emphasizing:
a. Strengthening bilateral, regional, and international cooperation, prioritizing neighboring countries.
b. Strengthening constructive relations with nonbelligerent countries.
c. Benefiting from relations to increase national strength.
d. Confronting bullying and aggressive measures in foreign affairs.
e. Striving to liberate the region from foreign military presence.
f. Supporting Muslims and oppressed and abased nations, particularly the nation of Palestine.
g. Striving to reform the structure of the United Nations.
h. Organizing joint efforts to create new regional and international economic, political, and cultural relations with the aim of guaranteeing world justice, peace, and security.

40) Striving to create development in current procedures based on Islamic values through an active and purposeful presence in international and regional organizations.

41) Raising Iran’s managing role in the distribution and transportation of energy, increasing export opportunities, attracting capital and advanced technology and helping establish an independent monetary, banking, and insurance system with the help of the regional, Islamic, and friendly countries with the aim of reducing dependence on the ruling monetary system.

42) Strengthening cultural, legal, political, and economic collaboration with the world, particularly those within the sphere of Islamic-Iranian civilization.

43) Strengthening the Islamic and Iranian identity of Iranians abroad, helping spread the Persian script and language among them, supporting their rights, and helping them participate in national development.

44) Fortifying and elevating permanent comprehensive security guaranteeing national goals and interests, emphasizing the following:

a. Strengthening the role of the people and popular intelligence in pursuing anti-security activities.
b. Strengthening effective collaboration of the intelligence, security, and judicial institutions and coordination between them to secure an intelligence presence and confront any kind of disturbance in public, economic, and social security and confront soft threats.
c. Creating a united system of information software, raising the level of protection of computerized information, the development of sciences and technologies related to protecting the security of information and communications systems with the aim of protecting the space for exchanging data, technical strengthening to confront violations in computer networks and protecting public and private space.
d. Increasing defensive deterrence capabilities with the aim of defending sovereignty; striving for the presence of popular forces in security and the defense of the country and the revolution through a qualitative and quantitative mobilization of the abased.
e. Developing passive defenses.
f. A lasting security of the border areas and effective control of the borders.

45) Territorial integrity, and national interests and security, and offering an effective reaction to foreign threats and creating a regional balance emphasizing:
a. Acquiring new knowledge and technology and advanced defensive software, and updating and repairing defensive industries, increasing the self-sufficiency ratio by developing research and utilizing all the country’s industrial potential.
b. Striving for the presence of the popular forces in security and the defense of the country and the revolution through a quantitative and qualitative mobilization of the abased.
c. Developing passive defensives.
d. Lasting security for the border regions and effective control thereof.

Source:
https://www.princeton.edu/irandataportal/laws/supreme-leader/khamenei/declaration-fifth-dev-pla/

Вопросы:

1. Каковы культурные задачи Ирана в соответствии с данным документом? 
2. Какие экономические приоритеты указаны в документе? 
3. В чем заключаются цели по защите и безопасности страны?
Document 9. Iran 1404 Outlook (2025)
The Future Outlook of the Islamic Republic of Iran in the Horizon of the Next Two Decades (2025)

With reliance to the ever-lasting power of the Almighty Allah and under the auspices of faith and national will and the programmed and the prudent collective attempt on the way of the ideals materialization and the principles of the constitution in the 20-year outlook: Iran is a developed country, with a first class economic, scientific and technological status in the region, with the Islamic and the revolutionary identification, inspiring in the world of Islam with the constructive and the effective interaction in international relationships.

The Iranian society will have the following characteristics under the horizon of this outlook:

Developed in accordance with its cultural, geographical and historical circumstances, and relied upon the moral principles and upon the Islamic, national and revolutionary values focusing on the religion of the public, on social justice, on lawful freedoms, on safeguarding human generosity and rights and having social and judicial security.

Having advanced science, capable in producing knowledge and technology, relied on higher share of human resources and social asset in the national productionSecured, independent and powerful settling down the defense based on all of the aspects of deterrence and adherence of the people and the government.

Having the health, welfare, judicial security, social security, equal opportunities, proper income distribution, secure family foundation, far from poverty, corruption, crimination and having, favorable living environment.

Active, responsibility acceptor, dedicated, faithful, satisfied, being conscientious, having discipline, the social co-operative and compromising morale, committed to the Islamic Revolution, to the Islamic system, and to the flourishing achievement of Iran, and to be proud of being Iranian.

Gaining the economic, scientific and technological first position in the region of the South West Asia(including Mid-Asia, Caucasia, the Middle East, and the neighboring countries). Putting emphasis on the software movement and science production, fast and
constant economic progress, and comparative promotion income level per capita and achieving the full-fledged employment.

Inspirer, active and effective in the world of Islam strengthening the role of the religion of the public, efficient development, ethical society, intellectual and social innovation and dynamism in the way of thinking, effective in the Islamic and in the regional convergence based on the Islamic instructions and Imam KHOMEINI’s meditations. Having constructive and effective interaction at the world based on glory, wisdom and expediency principles.

Note:

In prevarication, compilation and improvement of the development programs and the annual budgets, this point should be taken into consideration that their quantitative macro-indexes, such as the investment rate, per capita income, gross national product, occupation and inflation rate, reduction of the gap of income between the upper and the lower classes of the society, development of the culture, education and research and the defense and security abilities, should be adapted and clarified according to the development policies and the objectives and necessities of the outlook and these policies and aims should be completely regarded.

Source:


Вопросы:

1. Назовите приоритетные регионы мира во внешнеполитической стратегии ИРИ.
2. Какие проблемы современных международных отношений обозначены в документе?
3. Какие цели внешней политики страны продекларированы в данном документе?
CONCLUSION

The Islamic Republic of Iran looks at its relations with other states in the area and with the rest of the Islamic world as its foreign policy priority. This includes a strong commitment to the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) and the Non-Aligned Movement. Relations with the states of the Persian Gulf Cooperation Council (PGCC) have improved in recent years. However, an unresolved territorial dispute with the United Arab Emirates concerning three islands in the Persian Gulf continues to keep its relations with these states cool.

Iran is seeking new allies around the world due to its increasing political and economic isolation in the international community. This isolation is evident in the various economic sanctions that have been implemented in response to questions that have been raised over the Iranian nuclear program (Iran's Nuclear Program).

On the other hand, being influenced by the Cold-War-period mentality, President Ahmadinejad challenged to the current structure of the international system over the past eight years. Ahmadinejad counted for political-diplomatic support from as Russia and China and hoped that Iran as a regional power would stand against the international pressure and the West. Nevertheless, reality of globalization and economic interdependence of different countries have also become a serious factor of contemporary international relations.

By contrast, President Rouhani seeks to establish a balance between idealism and realism in foreign policy by understanding the internal needs and possibilities of Iran. Rouhani’s government seeks the interaction with the existing international system. With a reconciliatory tone, he tries to avoid worsening the relations between Iran and the world powers and to reach a win - win agreement with them. Certainly, by adopting detente policy and establishing a reasonable talk with the West and Russia/China, in near future Iran can become a reliable partner for the international community and contribute to efforts of creating stability and maintaining a warfare against terrorist groups in the Middle East. In general, it can be said that the foreign policy of Hassan Rouhanishould be viewed as an opportunity window not only for Iran, but also for the outside world to improve the bilateral ties and promote stability and prosperity in the region. There are
more positive signs given by the new government that Iran’s foreign policy in Rouhani term will help the country to correct its radical image and recuperate its economy to a certain extent.